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the pAth ForWArd For using proCurement 
lAW to help With development And the Fight 
AgAinst Corruption
daniel i. gordon  
Associate Dean for Government Procurement Law  
The George Washington University Law School
i. groWing reCognition oF the importAnt role 
proCurement CAn plAy in nAtionAl  
development And the Fight AgAinst  
Corruption
In international organizations as well as at the national and subna-
tional levels, there is growing recognition of the role that improving pro-
curement systems can play in supporting developing countries’ efforts to 
improve the lot of their citizens as well as in battling the corruption that 
drains public resources around the world. This is evidenced by both the 
heightened level of activity taking place in the international arena and in 
the increasing number of countries signing up to minimum procurement 
standards. Key examples of recently revised international documents are 
the 2011 Model Procurement Law issued by the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO GPA). The 
European Union (EU) is also in the midst of a substantial overhaul of its 
Procurement Directive, and the World Bank is undertaking the first revi-
sion, after many years, of its procurement policy.
While important, these changes will not meet the sometimes unrealistic 
expectations that some have. We discuss below the difference between har-
monization (or convergence) and uniformity among procurement systems 
and address how the growing acceptance of certain minimum standards 
fits in. We then turn to the limits of what good procurement laws can 
do to promote development and fight corruption, and point out broader 
contextual issues that are likely to be key if we are to make progress in 
the path forward.
ii. “hArmoniZAtion” oF proCurement lAW is muCh 
tAlked About – WhAt is it? 
A. there is a Worldwide trend to move toward more-and-
more similar procurement rules
Whether we use the term “harmonization” or “convergence,” similarities 
are much in evidence, if you compare UNCITRAL’s Model Procurement 
Law to the WTO GPA to the EU’s Procurement and Remedies Directives. 
Some of the key similarities (translating some terms to our American 
parlance) are that procurement laws and regulations must be publicly 
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available, potential bidders must generally be given a reasonable amount 
of time to prepare and submit their bids, specifications in solicitations must 
not be unduly restrictive, solicitations must disclose the government’s 
evaluation criteria and follow them, and governments must ensure that 
disappointed bidders have access to a forum that will consider protests. 
The similarities reach further than these broad points. It is thus com-
mon for systems to distinguish between what we would call sealed bidding 
(with public bid opening and price as the only evaluation criterion) and 
procurements allowing non-price factors that can result in the selection 
of other than the low-priced bid. Particularly significantly, more and more 
systems require some sort of a “stay” on procurements to ensure that a 
protester will have a chance to compete for a contract that it believes is 
being awarded improperly to a competitor. 
Moreover, these similarities reach beyond countries that have adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, have acceded to the WTO GPA 
or are members of the EU. In every free trade agreement that the U.S. has 
signed over the past 20 years, it has included government procurement 
provisions that reflect the core requirements set out above, and that in-
cludes agreements with countries as diverse as the Dominican Republic, 
Oman, Australia, Jordan, and Panama.
b. similarity does not mean uniformity
One could understand “harmonization” to mean a trend toward unifor-
mity. That is, once harmonization runs its course, all countries will have 
identical procurement rules. That, however, is not what is happening. 
Two countries can have similarities in their procurement systems, but 
still many – and critical – differences. In fact, the various international 
agreements make no pretense of requiring identical rules. For example, 
the EU Procurement and Remedies Directives set minimum require-
ments, but each one of the 27 EU member states can implement those 
requirements as it wishes, and the result is that procurement rules are 
not identical. That means that a French company hoping to obtain gov-
ernment contracts in Greece or Ireland or Finland, for instance, will have 
to learn the procurement rules in each of those countries. No surprise, 
therefore, that cross-border procurements are still relatively rare within 
the EU, decades after harmonization of the member states’ procurement 
systems through the Directives.
The same pattern can be seen in the context of a specific example from 
the WTO GPA. Article XI of that agreement sets 40 days as the normal 
minimum amount of time for submitting bids – but one country may use 
a 40-day deadline, while another uses a 45-day timeframe and a third 
one 50 days – a lack of uniformity that matters to a company considering 
submitting a bid and that needs to check the differing rules in countries 
that have acceded to the WTO GPA. In addition, a country that has ac-
ceded to the WTO GPA can have different rules for procurements that are 
covered by the agreement and those that are not, for example, by having 
shorter deadlines for bid submission for smaller purchases not covered 
by the GPA. 
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The differences go far beyond deadlines. Because the WTO GPA had 
to be agreed among countries with very different procurement systems, 
it merely sets a lowest common denominator threshold – an important 
achievement in itself, but not a recipe for uniformity. That means that 
the United States is fully compliant with the WTO GPA when we allow 
subjective assessments of past performance, and subjective tradeoffs be-
tween price and past performance or other non-price evaluation factors 
– while most other systems would view those subjective assessments as 
problematic, if not illegal. Similarly, although both the U.S. and the EU 
member states are bound by the WTO GPA, we routinely allow discussions 
between the government and offerors during a procurement, while the 
EU Procurement Directives strictly limit negotiations with bidders. One 
more example: while we view it as the core responsibility of our protest 
forums (the Court of Federal Claims and the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO)) to tell the government that it should re-open a procurement 
when the forum determines that a contract was unlawfully awarded, 
most countries – notwithstanding the similarity of a requirement for a 
protest forum – view it as beyond the power of a protest forum to call for 
the termination of a signed contract.
C. similarity may help reduce barriers to entry, but the 
lack of uniformity limits that 
In theory, at least, having more and more similarity among procure-
ment systems should reduce barriers to entry. Thus, one would hope that a 
bidder may be more willing to compete for a contract in a new government 
market when its procurement rules look familiar, the country has com-
mitted to not using anti-competitive specifications, and so forth. Whether 
the reality is so good is unknown – we simply do not have data. The little 
information we do have – the data from the European Union – suggests, 
as noted above, that companies are not obtaining contracts in foreign 
markets, even within the EU. There could be many reasons for that, but 
the lack of uniformity is certainly one candidate. For an Italian company 
thinking of competing for a government contract in Poland (another EU 
member state) or Singapore (another country that has acceded to the WTO 
GPA), the challenge of learning the Polish and Singaporean procurement 
rules must surely be a deterrent.
d. uniformity is not Attainable, nor desirable 
So should uniformity be on the international agenda? Should we view 
efforts at harmonization as a failure, if they do not bring us to uniformity? 
In the author’s view, the answer to both questions is: absolutely not.
First of all, uniformity is not attainable, at least not among sover-
eign states or in the foreseeable future. Anyone suggesting that the U.S. 
should forego the benefits of negotiations with offerors, evaluation of past 
performance, and “best value” tradeoff is simply out of touch with reality. 
Similarly, no one should expect the EU to agree to adopt these aspects of 
the U.S. approach to procurement. For that matter, even within the EU, 
it is hard to imagine, as a political matter, the European Commission 
in Brussels trying to dictate that all 27 member states of the EU adopt 
identical procurement rules. Uniformity is simply not going to happen. 
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What we have instead is neither uniformity nor “best practices,” but sim-
ply the lowest common denominator among very different procurement 
systems. The best example of this is the WTO GPA, which accommodates 
the very different procurement systems of countries that have acceded to 
it, particularly the U.S. and the member states of the European Union.
More importantly, though, uniformity is not something that we should 
be striving for. The United States, with our long history of the rule of law 
and our strong protections against corruption, can allow the subjectivity 
of past performance ratings and cost/technical tradeoffs, without fear 
of widespread abuse – while, for many countries, the risk of corruption 
makes use of those subjective tools unacceptable. Moreover, differences 
in procurement systems often reflect countries’ varying institutional and 
other histories, and having different rules is sensible. To give just one 
example: for historical reasons, GAO, which is the U.S.’s supreme audit 
institution, plays an important role in the adjudication of bid protests, 
while in virtually every other country in the world, it would be viewed as 
institutionally inappropriate for the national audit office to be functioning 
as an administrative court resolving procurement disputes. 
Another problem with advocating uniformity is that it assumes that 
uniformity will open up procurement markets, but the opposite could be 
the case. If other countries decided that they want to have uniformity with 
the U.S. in terms of preferences for small businesses and domestic bid-
ders, the result would be far more barriers to trade: every country could 
set aside procurements for its small businesses, as we do, and, instead of 
just one “Buy American Act,” we would have a Buy Italian Act and a Buy 
Australian Act and so forth around the world. 
In short, harmonization of procurement rules around the world has 
led to growing similarities among various nations’ procurement systems. 
There is not, however, uniformity among procurement systems, and that 
is probably the way things will, and perhaps should, remain.
iii. the limited role oF proCurement lAWs in  
promoting development And Fighting  
Corruption
A. improved procurement laws Can be helpful
Improving procurement law can help countries in developing 
their economies and combating corruption, in at least two broad 
ways. First, better procurement laws can provide direct benefits. 
A legal requirement for competition for public procurement contracts 
should reduce the frequency of sole-source awards, thus potentially bring-
ing the benefits of competition as well as reducing the trade in public 
contracts as rewards to friends and relatives of government officials. By 
mandating transparency throughout the acquisition process, procurement 
laws can also encourage more firms to compete for government contracts, 
thus potentially leading to more vigorous competition with respect to 
both price and quality. In addition, procurement laws can facilitate efforts 
to fight corruption, by (to give one important example) giving oversight 
bodies legal authority both to investigate allegations of unlawful conduct 
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(through bidders’ protests or otherwise) and to impose corrective measures. 
Although not viewed through the lens of the fight against corruption, 
enactment of the U.S. statutory provision giving GAO authority to issue 
protective orders in connection with bid protests, 31 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2)
(A), is an example of a procurement law that has enhanced accountability 
of public procurements.
Second, reforming procurement laws can address the problems caused 
by existing laws. In the author’s view, procurement laws benefit from 
simplicity, clarity, and uniformity, and suffer from complexity and exces-
sive detail. Although one can certainly criticize the amount of detail and 
complexity in the U.S. procurement system, the simple statutory statement 
in 10 U.S.C. § 2304 that, absent a lawful exception, “the head of an agency 
in conducting a procurement for property or services … shall obtain full 
and open competition through the use of competitive procedures ….” has 
served the U.S. well. Moreover, procurement laws, if not revised periodi-
cally, risk creating barriers to improvement in governance and efficiency. 
Thus, if a country’s procurement laws preclude the use of e-commerce in 
procurement, the country will not be able to take advantage of the enor-
mous potential that the use of the Internet offers, in terms of increasing 
both competition and transparency. For that matter, if a country has not 
revised its procurement laws in the past 20 years, it may not be permissible 
for vendors and the government to use e-mail in communicating with one 
another, whether it’s the government that wants to issue a solicitation or a 
vendor that wants to submit a bid. Outdated procurement laws may also 
not allow countries to take advantage of relatively new, but now widely 
accepted practices, such as framework agreements (what the U.S. system 
calls indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts) or use of non-price 
evaluation criteria.
b. the impact of improved procurement laws is, however, 
limited
Notwithstanding these benefits from improved procurement laws, 
changing the legal framework for awarding contracts has only limited 
impact on the developmental benefit of procurements and on the struggle 
against corruption, for two overarching reasons.
1. procurement laws generally do not Cover  
procurement planning or Contract Administration
First, procurement laws almost invariably focus only on the middle 
stage of acquisitions, the selection of the contractor. From providing timely 
and meaningful notice to potential bidders on upcoming procurements to 
enabling disappointed bidders a way to challenge the selection of a competi-
tor, good procurement laws cover all the steps surrounding award of the 
contract. What procurement laws typically do not cover, however, are the 
steps before and after. Thus, planning for a procurement – the first step – 
is not typically the subject of procurement laws. Whether the government 
needs a new bridge may be a political decision (the U.S. experience with 
a “bridge to nowhere” comes to mind), or a transportation infrastructure 
decision, but it is, in most systems, not a decision affected by procurement 
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law. Similarly, the decision to use a contractor to perform services, rather 
than have government employees provide the services, is very often not 
a subject covered by procurement law, if it is addressed in law at all. In 
the U.S., those “insourcing” and “outsourcing” decisions straddle the line 
between procurement and management decisions, with a heavy dose of 
political considerations, but even in the U.S., those decisions are not ones 
viewed as exclusively within the province of procurement law.
Procurement law does have a significant, if limited role, in the procure-
ment planning process. The one very important role procurement law can 
play is to prohibit unduly restrictive specifications and to allow potential 
contractors to challenge specifications. That is the one aspect of procure-
ment planning where international norms have developed in a positive 
way. Otherwise, good procurement planning is very difficult to legislate. 
The U.S. has tried to require adequate market research through legisla-
tion, but the impact of that legislation has been limited.
Perhaps even more important than procurement planning, everything 
that occurs after award of the contract is often viewed as not part of 
procurement law. In many countries, once the contract is signed, the role 
of procurement law ends, and the role of the country’s ordinary contract 
law begins. That bright line is evident in the international documents 
related to procurement: neither the WTO GPA nor the UNCITRAL Model 
Procurement Law nor the EU Procurement Directives address contract 
administration (or contract execution or contract management, as that 
phase is also called). Yet whether the concern is development or the fight 
against corruption, contract administration is at least as important as 
selection of the contractor. In terms of economic development, if a country 
does an outstanding job competing a contract for a new highway with 
significant developmental potential, but then does not supervise the con-
tractor adequately, it may find that the contractor does not deliver what it 
promised. Instead, what is delivered may be over budget or behind sched-
ule or constructed using inferior materials or processes – if the highway 
is ever built at all. In fact, weaknesses in contract administration may 
undermine progress in improving the contract award process. Thus, a firm 
may win a contract by intentionally overpromising, in terms of schedule, 
price, or quality, knowing that it can recover, whether through corrupt 
acts or simply ordinary contract changes, during performance.
2. procurement law details matter Far less than What 
happens on the ground
Even with respect to the middle step in procurements, the selection of 
the contractor, there can be unjustified expectations. Time and again, there 
has been excessive focus on the details of procurement law, while transla-
tion of the law into practice has gotten inadequate attention. Examples of 
wasted focus on details of procurement law are legion. The Congress of the 
United States has a long tradition of trying to micro-management procure-
ment law, with little if any benefit. The European Union created a scheme 
for “dynamic purchasing systems” in the 2004 Procurement Directive that 
was so complicated that those systems have reportedly rarely been used. 
The risk of time spent creating detailed regulation being wasted is par-
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ticularly common in areas where technology is rapidly changing, such as 
e-commerce vehicles. Thus, in the U.S., much time and energy was spent 
in the 1990s developing legal rules for a “Federal Acquisition Computer 
Network” or FACNET – but the entire effort was eventually abandoned 
in the face of the rise of widespread use of the Internet.
More complicated is the way these questions have sometimes played 
out in discussions between developing countries and outside institutions 
financing procurements in those countries, whether the outsiders are more 
developed countries’ governments or international financial institutions. 
The desire to insist that the laws governing the procurements be adequate 
is understandable, since those laws will govern the way the procurements 
are handled, at least with respect to the legal framework. Accordingly, it 
is understandable that the outside institutions are skeptical of the use 
of many borrowing countries’ procurement legal frameworks, and would 
prefer to impose their own rules for purposes of procurements financed 
by the outside institutions. Imposing outside rules often appears to be a 
way to mitigate the risk of corruption and to improve transparency, es-
pecially because employees of the outside institutions are more likely to 
be familiar with their own institutions’ procurement rules than with the 
borrowing countries’ laws. 
Yet all recognize that allowing the borrowing countries to use their 
own procurement laws has advantages – in terms of strengthening the 
domestic procurement systems as well as showing respect for the borrow-
ing countries. Moreover, because, as discussed above, there are interna-
tionally only similarities, and not uniformity, with respect to procurement 
rules, borrowing countries may find themselves having to use one set of 
rules for procurements financed by one lending institution and another 
set of rules for procurements, conducted at the same time but financed by 
another lending institution. The resulting inconsistencies with domestic 
law (and among lending institutions) not only do not help build domestic 
procurement institutions – they may affirmatively weaken those institu-
tions by diverting attention and resources from them due to the need to 
invest time and energy learning and applying parallel sets of rules – a 
challenging scenario that would cause problems even in countries with 
the best developed procurement systems.
Moreover, all of this risks distracting from the bigger picture. An exces-
sive focus on legal and procedural details of the contract award process 
may lead to neglect of procurement planning and contract administration, 
and even with respect to the contract award process that is the subject of 
procurement law, the focus may be too much on rules and not enough on 
reality. From the point of view of employees and consultants representing 
outside institutions, the focus on the lending institution’s contract award 
rules is comforting – they represent familiar terrain. But whether that 
focus delivers results on the ground is another question entirely.
The fact is that even countries with highly developed, highly respected 
procurement systems face significant challenges in implementation. There 
are few countries in the world with procurement law systems as detailed 
and as developed as the U.S. has – and yet the U.S. is plagued with per-
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sistent weaknesses in procurement planning and contract oversight, and 
even conducting competitions for award is often challenging. To take one 
simple example: the fact that U.S. law has full and open competition as 
the legal default, with sole-source procurements requiring justification 
and high-level approval in no way means that all sole-source contract 
awards are legal justified (much less that they are all good practice). The 
dozens of decisions issued by the Court of Federal Claims and GAO each 
year in favor of protesters claiming violation of procurement law attest to 
the difficulties that exist, even within a very sophisticated procurement 
legal framework.
iv. the pAth ForWArd noW mAy reQuire FoCus more 
on prACtiCe thAn on legAl detAils
There may be benefit in outside lending institutions agreeing that 
borrowing countries may use their domestic procurement legal framework 
when conducting procurements financed by those outside institutions, 
much more often than is the case today. That does not mean that any legal 
framework will do, nor that lending institutions should cease oversight 
over the use of their loans (or grants) merely because a country’s legal 
framework is viewed as acceptable. 
A. shifting to a principled Approach to Assessing  
Countries’ domestic procurement legal systems
Rather than the current focus on details of procurement law, it may 
be more useful to focus on the minimum essentials needed for a country’s 
procurement system to be acceptable. While one could certainly improve 






of procurements, including details of what the government 
requires as well as the criteria that the government will use 




ing specifications, exclusion from consideration, and contract 
award
It is noteworthy that two potential issues are missing from this list. 
First, nothing is said here about the procurement method used – the choice 
among what Americans would call sealed bidding, negotiated procure-
ment, simplified acquisition procedures, and micropurchasing. The choice 
between sealed bidding and negotiated procedures is a complicated one, 
although it is understandable that many believe that it is advisable for 
countries with weaker governmental institutions, in general, and procure-
ment systems, in particular, to stay away from negotiations. Similarly, 
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those countries may be well advised to rely as much as possible on price 
as the sole award criterion, with needed technical features assessed on a 
pass/fail basis (the equivalent of “low price, technically acceptable” in the 
U.S. system). And while every system allows for more flexible and less 
open and transparent procedures for small purchases, the core principles 
should be competition, transparency, and accountability, even if deviations 
are permitted for smaller buys.
Second, a ban on domestic preferences is not included in the list of 
core points set out above. Opposing those preferences is understandable 
for outside institutions dealing with developing countries, especially 
since contractors from the rich countries would like access to the borrow-
ing countries’ government procurements. The rich countries’ arguments 
are, however, somewhat undermined by the fact that at least one highly-
developed procurement system, the United States’, employs an extensive 
web of domestic preferences, and it is hard to justify the U.S., at least, 
insisting that a developing country not have the sort of domestic prefer-
ence that the U.S. insists on for itself. It is worth noting, however, that in 
smaller economies, the effect of absolute preferences for domestic sources 
may sharply limit competition, and thus facilitate collusion among the 
limited number of domestic suppliers, while opening up procurements 
to foreign sources may disrupt that kind of collusion. If domestic prefer-
ences are allowed, price evaluation mechanisms may be preferable (for 
example, by increasing the price of bids from foreign sources by 10 percent 
for evaluation purposes), because they are not absolute.
Overall, under this principled-based approach, any procurement sys-
tem that is consistent with the lowest-common-denominator approach of 
the WTO GPA would certainly pass muster, as would others, whether they 
followed the EU Procurement and Remedies Directives, the UNCITRAL 
Model Procurement Law, the government contracting provisions of the 
U.S.’s free trade agreements, or another similar model.
b. shifting to Focus on performance and results, rather 
than law
The challenge in shifting the focus from law to practice is the “how” 
question, that is, finding realistic ways to ensure good practice. This is 
a real and difficult challenge. In terms of procurement planning, while 
outsiders can counsel developing countries about which procurements 
are worthwhile, the ultimate decision about what to buy is obviously for 
the country to make – although whether the outside institution agrees to 
finance the procurement is, just as obviously, a decision for that institu-
tion to make.
Once a procurement is underway, and particularly once the contractor 
has been selected, the key principles set out above can form a roadmap for 
reviewing the process. For example, anyone wanting to assess the process 
will want to know whether there were unjustified barriers to competition, 
through restrictive solicitation requirements or failure to provide adequate 
advance notice to potential bidders. If the country decided not to conduct 
a competition, the reasonableness of that decision should be carefully 
scrutinized. Where a competition was held, judging whether it was fair 
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and meaningful competition is not easy. The number of bids received can 
be a useful measure, which is why the U.S. has come to focus on procure-
ments that, while ostensibly conducted using full and open competition, 
led to receipt of only one bid. Yet, if collusion is potentially present, even 
receipt of multiple bids does not guarantee real competition.
In assessing whether there has been a fair competition, the most 
important stakeholders, at least in theory, are the potential or actual 
competitors that did not receive the contract. What is at issue is account-
ability for the contract award process, and disappointed bidders have the 
most obvious stake in that, so that it is no surprise that a country’s bid 
protest system – its domestic review mechanism – plays a central role. 
The question of the adequacy of a country’s bid protest mechanism 
demonstrates the risk of focusing on legal details. As a formal matter, a 
country may address the requirement for domestic review procedures by 
allowing disappointed bidders access to the country’s court system. Yet 
in reality that solution may be meaningless. The court system may be 
incapable, as a practical matter, of moving fast enough to provide disap-
pointed bidders with timely relief; or the judges may be corrupt; or the 
courts may lack the independence needed to challenge the government’s 
conduct of procurements.
There are some minimum requirements for the legal framework for a 
bid protest system, but they should not distract from the need to assess 
what happens in practice. Thus, if the law does not provide some way to 
correct improperly conducted procurements, it is inadequate. That can 
be through an EU-type “standstill” imposed before signature of the con-
tract, or a U.S.-type post-award “stay” of performance, or potentially in 
other ways – but there must be some way for the protest forum to have 
the problem in the procurement addressed. Also, if the law requires such 
a quick decision on protests as to preclude meaningful review, that is a 
problem, and an extremely short period (for example, 3 days) may well 
be too short to allow for meaningful review.
But beyond those minimum parameters, the focus needs to shift to 
practical questions, such as whether potential protesters are afraid to 
file protests; whether the protest forum is independent of the contracting 
entity; whether it has authority to obtain all the information, including 
documents, that it needs to reach a decision; whether, in practice, it is 
willing to rule against a government entity; and whether its decisions are 
followed. Where the needed elements are present, protests can provide 
meaningful accountability and help ensure that gaps between the legal 
standards and reality are identified. 
As to contract performance, again, any discussion needs to begin with 
recognition of how challenging it is to ensure effective management of 
contracts. The key is meaningful and timely oversight of the contractor, 
but addressing that has institutional, budgetary, and political aspects. In 
the U.S. experience, performance problems are particularly severe when 
the government is not in frequent communication with the contractor 
and there are not enough adequately trained government representatives 
on the ground. Because contract changes – increasing the price that the 
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government will pay, delaying delivery, or reducing the quantity or quality 
of what is to be delivered – can undermine the value of the contract to the 
government, a control mechanism requiring high-level and transparent 
approval of more significant changes may be helpful. In the most extreme 
situations, the U.S. has resorted to frequent external oversight reviews, 
whether by GAO, inspectors general, or even Congressional committees, 
but such measures must, by necessity, be reserved for the largest projects. 
The construction of the Capitol Visitor Center in Washington, D.C., is 
an example of a large project that was the subject of intensive external 
oversight throughout performance of the contract.
v. ConClusion
As efforts continue to improve procurement around the world, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the goal is not uniformity, but creation of the 
minimum legal standards required for a sound procurement system, with 
the focus then shifting to the surrounding elements that can translate the 
legal rules into good practice. That critical context includes, in particular, 
respect for the rule of law; strong, democratic governmental institutions; 
a public procurement workforce that is adequately staffed, compensated, 
and trained; independent oversight, audit, and judicial institutions; a pri-
vate sector that is willing and able to compete for government contracts, 
and to speak up when procurement laws are not followed; and a free and 
vibrant press. 
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